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Amour-propre is a central concept for understanding early-modern moral and po-
litical thought. Much attention in recent scholarship has been placed on the
analysis of amour-propre in which the excessive attraction to the self (amour-
propre) is distinguished from the proper love of the self (amour de soi) that
can be argued to correlate with the love of God.¹ This is a familiar idea of the
juxtaposition between charity as a theological concept and self-love that cor-
rupts it. Scholars are also aware that early-modern authors took different ap-
proaches to amour-propre, concupiscence, self-love and self-interest and not
all of the seventeenth-century authors outright condemned human selfishness.²
Of the early-modern authors following this line of interpretation Jean-Jacques
Rousseau characteristically makes a distinction between proper self-preservation
(instinctual) and “excessive, and illusion-ridden attachment to the self”.³ Mi-
Kari Saastamoinen inspired me to broaden my methodological approach during my doctoral
studies in the mid-2000s to a closer reading of texts than what I was accustomed to at the
time. It is this method of close, philosophical reading that I follow in this paper. Heikki
Haara pressed me to contribute to this collection of papers for which I am now thankful. I
would also like to express my gratitude to Béatrice Guion for her very helpful comments and
criticism on my reading of Pierre Nicole on different occasions. I’m also grateful to Eric Schliess-
er, Christian Maurer and James Harris for organising workshops in the early 2010s that contrib-
uted to my thinking on Nicole.
 For considerations of different aspects of Rousseau’s conception of amour-propre, see Nicho-
las J. H. Dent, “Amour-propre” in his A Rousseau Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 33–36
and Dent, “Rousseau on amour-propre,” Supplement to the Transactions of the Aristotelian Soci-
ety 72 (1998): 57–73. See also Timothy O’Hagan, “Rousseau on amour-propre: on Six Facets of
amour-propre,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 91– 107 and Frederick Neuhous-
er, “Rousseau on the Relation between Reason and Self-Love (amour-propre),” Internationales
Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 1 (2003): 221–239.
 The ‘arguments for the constructive potential of human corruption’ by La Rochefoucauld, Pas-
cal, and Nicole have been studied for example in Ben Rogers, “In Praise of Vanity: the Augus-
tinian Analysis of the Benefits of Vice from Port-Royal to Mandeville” (PhD diss., University of
Oxford, 1994).
 Michael Moriarty, Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves: Early Modern French Thought II (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2006), 238. See also Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Eco-
nomic Science (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and especially Béatrice Guion, “Du traité des
passions à l’art de se connaître soi-même: l’écrit moral au XVIIe siècle,” in L’Homme et ses Pas-
sions, Actes du XVIIe Congrès international de l’Association Guillaume Budé, eds. Isabelle Boehm,
Jean-Louis Ferrary et Sylvie Franchet d’Espèrey (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2016), 643–654.
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chael Moriarty has shown that also Cornelius Jansen was pointing to this divi-
sion and that there are also other seventeenth-century authors who did not
lack conceptual tools to separate natural self-preservation from perverted attach-
ment to self.⁴ The interpretation of Rousseau’s role in shaping early-modern dis-
cussion of amour-propre has been particularly great. This same division between
amour de soi and amour-propre has also been extended to concern Adam Smith.⁵
The main concept that then emerges from this analysis is of course that of inter-
est.⁶ While these major figures and this approach to amour-propre have received
much attention, what has not been fully exhausted is a nuanced analysis of
amour-propre offered in Pierre Nicole’s essays where the conceptual tool of inter-
est is not sufficient to grasp the relevance of amour-propre.⁷ The argument put
forward in this essay is that Nicole, as an Augustinian intellectual, formulated
a theoretically significant analysis of amour-propre that can be seen to differ
from the interest-centred analysis explained above that crucially anticipated
eighteenth-century British thinking on civil society.⁸ Instead of self-interest,
the main emphasis in Nicole’s theory is on self-esteem and how our conception
of the self is constructed in reciprocal relationship with our interlocutors. The
purpose, in short, is to articulate Nicole’s theory of amour-propre and to show
 Moriarty, Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves, 171– 185.
 Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith, 41–47. Force takes his cue from Rousseau’s definition
of amour-propre already in Force, “Self-Love, Identification, and the Origin of Political Econo-
my,” Yale French Studies 92 (1997): 46–64.
 For classic interpretation putting the emphasis particularly on interest in Jansenist under-
standing of amour-propre, see Marcel Raymond, “Du jansénisme à la morale de l’intrétêt,” Mer-
cure de France 1126 (1957): 238–255. For more elaborations on interest in, see Marcel Gauchet,
“De l’avènement de l’individu à la décoverte de la société”, in Annales E.S.C. 34 (1979): 451–463;
Dominique Weber, “Le ‘commerce d’amour-propre’ selon Pierre Nicole,” Astérion – Philosophie,
histoire des idées, pensée politique 5 (2007): 169–196. For elaborations of the relevance of interest
for eighteenth-century Britain, see Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977) and Malcolm Jack, Corruption and Progress: The Eight-
eenth-Century Debate (New York: AMS Press, 1989). For a useful further analysis of the relevance
of French moralists with respect to the question of formation of modern society, see Johan Heil-
bron, “French Moralists and the Anthropology of the Modern Era,” in The Rise of the Social Sci-
ences and the Formation of Modernity: Conceptual Change in Context, 1750– 1850, ed. Johan Heil-
bron, Lars Magnusson, and Björn Wittrock (Dordrecht: Springer, 1998), 77–106.
 My interpretation is thus not intended as a critical intervention in Nicole studies, but as a con-
tribution on the use and relevance of Nicole’s essays in the eighteenth-century British context.
For critical scholarship on Nicole and his essays, see Béatrice Guion, Pierre Nicole moraliste
(Paris: Honoré Champion, 2002).
 For a somewhat contrasting interpretation, see Béatrice Guion, “The Fable of the bees: proles
sine matre?,” in Bernard de Mandeville’s Tropology of Paradoxes: Morals, Politics, Economics, and
Therapy, eds. Edmundo Balsemão Pires and Joaquim Braga (Cham: Springer, 2015), 91– 104.
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how Nicole constructed one of the building blocks for the architects of the Scot-
tish Enlightenment. At the same time, Nicole deserves our attention on his own
right as one of the great historical observers of human condition.
Light of God and Hobbism
Pierre Nicole’s essays were mainly composed in 1670s. The first volume of them
was translated into English already in 1680. John Locke compiled his own trans-
lations of three of Nicole’s essays in 1675–8. By the turn of the century Nicole’s
essays were widely known in Britain. These essays can be interpreted in various
ways.We may read them with a view to a normative doctrine, which spells out in
terms of basic Christian principles of toleration, charity and respect. We may
even consider Nicole’s view of Christian politeness. However, Nicole’s essays
also include a perceptive, naturalistic analysis of civil society based on an ac-
count of the basic principles of human nature. The descriptive account may be
seen as independent from the normative side of Nicole’s essays. In this article,
Nicole’s essays are interpreted as a blueprint towards the development of polit-
ical philosophy in the works of Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Adam Smith
and many others. The discussion will concentrate on this descriptive side of Nic-
ole.
The concept of concupiscence plays a crucial role in the Augustinian moral
tradition to which Pierre Nicole belongs.⁹ For Pierre Nicole it is a general term
referring to the position of the fallen man that has left him in a direct contrast
with God. Nicole’s argument is geometrical in design. He claims that a man is
either motivated through God or this worldly “inclination” that, in short, is a
“general propensity of our corrupt nature”.¹⁰ Nicole is not attempting to pin
 I find Moriarty, Fallen nature, Fallen Selves as a useful account of Augustinian background for
eighteenth-century French thinking. About Pierre Nicole, including his Augustinian background
see, Edward D. James, Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and Humanist: A Study of his Thought (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
 Pierre Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, contain’d in several treatises
on many important duties, vol. 3 (London, 1680) 4. Pierre Nicole, “De la connoissance de soi-
même,” in Essais de morale [Document électronique]: contenus en divers traittez sur plusieurs de-
voirs importans, (Reprod. de l’éd. de, Paris: G. Desprez, 1701, 1997), III, 4–5. I have compared the
quotes that I use with the original French text. If I modify the translation, I give the original
French text in the footnote. Otherwise, I only indicate the pages to the French edition that I
have used. However, for clarity’s sake I have substituted most of the references to ‘self-love’
used in the translation with ‘amour-propre’, if there is no indication that Nicole in that particular
point is clearly pointing at the ‘self-love’ side of amour-propre.
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down the actual concept in all its implications, but points out that all the “senti-
ments of concupiscence” are “contrary to the law of God and his eternal jus-
tice”.¹¹ This, however, does not imply that the outward actions motivated
through these sentiments would necessarily be in conflict with God’s will.
It is important to notice that concupiscence is characterised as an inclina-
tion.We are either drawn towards God or pulled away from him. Nicole explains
this dichotomy by writing that in ‘the bottom of the heart’ we can find two sep-
arate and conflicting principles, the love of “God” and the love of “creature”.¹²
Epistemologically the matter is simple. Either our actions are motivated through
the love of God or concupiscence. Only a few live through God’s grace and sin-
cerely love God. This is possible only if God’s will, placed in the heart, touches
the person in a certain way, which in other words means that he has been given
efficient grace. Such a person treats other people with charity. Perhaps the easi-
est way to understand the role of grace is to say that the ones who act through
grace have God’s will as their motivating principle. Their love of God “spills
over” towards other people as charity. The rest are sinners. They have God’s
light in their heart, but it does not sensibly motivate.
The idea that the soul needs to be sensibly touched by God is important for
Nicole. It is, he thinks, perfectly logical to state that God’s justice is implanted in
every human heart, but only a select few are effectively moved by it. The idea of
being touched is important also in other respects. For example, Nicole does not
have to revert to an unconvincing argument that God’s light or justice would be
dim or weak in some people and stronger in others. God is the truth and there
cannot be any variations of it. This also explains how most of the people are mo-
tivated through another principle. Only from the “insensibility towards” God
“springs” our “sensible and lively esteem for creatures”. Human soul is a faculty
that simply “cannot be without some inclination, and must always fix her self on
some object”.¹³ Thus, if it is not God and our love for him that moves us, it must
be something else, which in Nicole’s vocabulary is termed concupiscence.
 Pierre Nicole, “A discourse, wherein is shown how dangerous conversation is,” in Moral es-
says, contain’d in several treatises on many important duties, vol. 2 (London, 1684), 272. Nicole,
“Discours où l’on fait voire combien les entretiens des hommes sont dangereux,” in Essais de
morale, II, 66–67.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 118. Nicole, “De la connois-
sance de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 139– 140.
 Pierre Nicole, “Of the fear of God,” in Moral essays, contain’d in several treatises on many
important duties, 3rd. ed., vol. 1 (London, 1696), 83. Nicole, “De la crainte de Dieu,” in Essais
de morale, I, 168.
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This dichotomy is also the root of Nicole’s rigorous Jansenist conception of
sin. However, by constructing his theory in this way, Nicole leaves another option
open. Also a sinner can be a good Christian by trying to reform the wicked state
of his soul and desiring to live according to God’s law. Since God’s light is im-
planted in the soul, even when it does not sensibly motivate, everyone is able
to know God’s eternal law and will. In fact, not even the worst of human beings
are able to escape the “penetrating rays of his justice”.¹⁴ Thus, everyone who
truly desires (and is capable of using the faculty of reason) is able to learn
“the law”, “the will” and “the order of God”.¹⁵ However, for these sinners
God’s justice is not an intrinsic, motivating principle in the soul and it never
will be if God does not change their inner constitution. These men have to strive
for the truth by trying to conquer the contrasting inclination, concupiscence,
which is also a naturally motivating principle of the heart. Main point of Nicole’s
normative doctrine is the idea that it is possible that men may consciously carry
out good acts (those that God wills us to do and that are in accordance with his
law and order) and lead a life of a good Christian, even when they do not have
efficient grace and God’s will does not efficiently move them.¹⁶
On most occasions Nicole uses concupiscence as a rather vague, general
term referring to man’s overall inclination to drift away from God. Amour-propre,
on the other hand, directly linked to this propensity, is a faculty that is pinned
down more precisely. In fact, Nicole’s significance as a moral philosopher should
perhaps be evaluated as an attempt to analyse this difficult concept and form a
logical system of its implications.
For Nicole amour-propre is the first principle. The idea of concupiscence
might remark the fact that our souls are inclined towards creatures, but it is
not really towards all the creatures that we are drawn to. Nicole’s way of further
unravelling this inclination is with a necessary reference to amour-propre. A man
is in love with himself instead of God. When describing our fallen state, Nicole
remarks that ‘we bring into the world with us a will totally taken up with the
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 58. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 123.
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 54. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 76. Nicole, “Of the means to conserve peace amongst men,”
in Moral essays, I, 115. Nicole, “Des moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes,” in Essais
de morale, I, 232.
 About God, grace and concupiscence see especially James, Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and Hu-
manist.
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love of itself, and incapable of loving any thing but with relation to our selves’.¹⁷
A man does “not only love himself”. He “loves himself without limits, and with-
out measure; loves only himself, and refers all to himself”. He simply cannot
even desire anything that does not stand in a certain “relation to himself”.¹⁸ It
is evident that without efficient grace there is no possibility of universal benev-
olence, but how does Nicole’s account differ from Hobbists who also claim that a
man is an utterly selfish creature, naturally incapable of other-regarding affec-
tion?
Some commentators think that it does not differ at all. Pierre Force has em-
blematically argued that “Nicole agrees entirely with Hobbes on the description
of human nature”.¹⁹ I agree that there are passages in Nicole’s essays that give
the impression that his understanding of human nature is in accordance with
what has often been taken as Hobbes’s view. It is thus crucial for us to read care-
fully Nicole’s essay Of charity and self-love. Nicole argues that we have “a secret
inclination to seek all things” for ourselves. A man, Nicole writes, has a natural
propensity to “make himself the center of all”. This principle is also character-
ised as ‘a natural tyranny’ elsewhere.²⁰ This “tyrannical disposition” to make ev-
erything centre in us is irresistibly ‘stamped in the bottom of ’ our “hearts”. It
“renders” us “violent, unjust, cruel, ambitious, flatterers, envious, insolent
and quarrellous”. As Nicole dramatically rounds off his argument – it is truly
“a monster” that “we harbour in our bosoms”.²¹
It might be a monster that we harbour in our breasts, but it is not a Hobbist
monster. In a Hobbist system self-love engages men to hurt others is a battle for
survival.We may debate whether this was Thomas Hobbes’s own first principle,
but we have to accept it when we talk about Hobbism. In this theory self-preser-
vation is the beginning and the end. Nicole agrees that all our wrongdoings are
caused by amour-propre. It certainly “includes the seeds of all the crimes, and of
all the misdemeanors of men, from the smallest, even to the most detestable
 Nicole, “A discourse, wherein is shown how dangerous conversation is,” in Moral essays, II,
259. Nicole, “Discours où l’on fait voire combien les entretiens des hommes sont dangereux,” in
Essais de morale, II, 51.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 124. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 147.
 Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith, 77.
 Nicole, “Of Grandeur,” inMoral essays, II, 194. Nicole, “De la grandeur”, Essais de morale, II,
218.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 124. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 147.
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ones”.²² “The love of our selves”, Nicole underscores, is the “fountain of all our
maladies” and it “gives us a violent inclination for pleasures, for promotion, for
all that doth nourish our curiosity” and it “disposes us to procure” our “desires
by all sorts of means how unjust and how criminal soever they may be”. But Nic-
ole’s conception of amour-propre is something different than that of Hobbism.
First of all, Nicole’s idea of what causes us to revert to unjust means is not a
struggle to preserve ourselves no matter what. The only reason why our worldly
inclinations are so violent is that by centring everything to ourselves we are des-
perately trying “to fill up” that “terrible vacuity which the loss of our true hap-
piness hath caused in our hearts”.²³
This wretched state of the soul is the characteristic feature of a fallen man. A
man cannot “bear the interior reproach” of his “disorder”.²⁴ He does not become
aware of his disorder by a conscious process, but feels it ever since the day he is
born and thus “inclines continually to fly from himself”. It is because of this des-
perate misery of not being touched by God that we revert to means that are un-
just and criminal. “A man without grace” is such “a great punishment to him-
self” that he “looks” even “upon himself in some sort as his own great
enemy”.²⁵ We are unconsciously trying to put ourselves in God’s place. Inevitably
Nicole thinks that this is an uphill battle. The urge to succeed is so violent that
without outward restrictions we might turn to any means necessary. Simulta-
neously, man’s miserable life is uncontrollably swayed by “violent passions”
that “spring from an unknown root” and “proceed from a hidden abyss”.²⁶ Nic-
ole does not understand the prevalence of amour-propre as mere self-preserva-
tion. He is constructing his theory from different perspective. Meanwhile, he
has no problem of using and modifying Hobbes’s ideas.
When we understand the foundation of Nicole’s point of view, another vital
aspect of amour-propre becomes comprehensible. The inherent need to centre ev-
erything around ourselves is called a tyrannical propensity for a reason. The sim-
plest and most primitive way of trying to fill up the emptiness of our soul is to
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 124–5. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 147.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” inMoral essays, III, 64. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 76.
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 59. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 124.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 4. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 4.
 Nicole, “Of the fear of God,” in Moral essays, I, 80. Nicole, “De la crainte de Dieu,” in Essais
de morale, I, 163.
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“dominate over” the “fellow-travellers in the same unfortunate road”.²⁷ A fallen
man is never fully cured of this instinctive quality and all men “inevitably” have
an inclination “of domineering and lording over” other “men”.²⁸ This desire
manifests itself in all the possible aspects of life. A particularly strong feature
of human nature is a “desire of domineering over the minds of others”.²⁹ Once
a man has obtained some opinion, he is “naturally wedded to” it. Not necessa-
rily because it would be a token of particularly good judgment, but because he is
“never free from a desire of lording it over others by all ways possible”.³⁰
It is clear that the simplest and most inevitable function of amour-propre is
to covet “sovereignty”. Once we are “regarded and looked upon by others as
great and powerful” and “we stir up in the hearts of others motions of respect
and submission”, this grossly supports our secret design to put our own image
in the place of God’s.³¹ This is the part of amour-propre that is traditionally de-
scribed as self-love and derived from Hobbes’s account that is couched to mate-
rial goods and self-preservation. Like Hobbes, Nicole claims that in a society
where there is no government, “every one would be master, and tyrannize
over others”. In this state it would be “a necessity” that “the stronger become
lords, whilst the weak remain subject”.³² Pierre Force is correct when he writes
that Nicole agrees with Hobbes about the origin of government.³³ Indeed, in
his key-essay, Of charity and self-love, Nicole follows Hobbes’s description of
the origin of the government closely. But in order to understand Nicole’s argu-
ment we have to see what he is doing when he agrees with Hobbes. Nicole’s
idea is to modify the Hobbist conception of amour-propre. In this particular
essay he retains parts of Hobbes’s account while his concrete point is to criticise
the actual theory.
 Nicole, “A discourse of the necessity of not trusting the conduct of ones life to chance, and of
not guiding it by the rules of fancy,” inMoral essays, II, 134. Nicole, “Discours sur la necessité de
se nepas conduire du hazard, et par des regles de fantaisie,” in Essais de morale, II, 22.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 133. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 157.
 Nicole, “Of the means to conserve peace amongst men,” in Moral essays, I, 116. Nicole, “Des
moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes,” in Essais de morale, I, 233.
 Nicole, “Of the means to conserve peace amongst men,” in Moral essays, I, 114. Nicole, “Des
moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes,” in Essais de morale, I, 232.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 131–132. Nicole, “De la charité et de
l’amour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 156.
 Nicole, “A discourse of the necessity of not trusting the conduct of ones life to chance, and of
not guiding it by the rules of fancy,” in Moral essays, II, 147. Nicole, “Discours sur la necessité de
se nepas conduire du hazard, et par des regles de fantaisie,” in Essais de morale, II, 162.
 Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith, 76–78.
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If the idea is to “represent” the “disposition of the hearts of men” towards
“one another” in the hypothetical state of nature, we may plausibly state that
it is, of course, a “condition of war” and “each man is naturally an enemy to
all other men”.³⁴ Nicole carries on in this Hobbist mean. The only way that the
“multitude of people”, who “only endeavour the ruin of one another”, can be
rendered into “societies, commonwealths, and kingdoms” is when amour-propre
“which is the cause of this war” changes its ways and eventually guides people
how to “live in peace”. A man “loves domination”. He “loves to enslave all the
world to it”, but he “loves yet more life and convenientness, and an easie life
more than domination; and sees clearly that others are no ways disposed to suf-
fer themselves to be domineered over”.³⁵ Once men realise the “impossibility of
succeeding by force” in their tyrannical designs, they are obliged “to submit
ones self to the care of his own preservation” by uniting with other men. “To
strengthen this union, laws are made, and punishments ordered for those who
violate them. Thus by means of tortures, and gibbets set up in publick, the
thoughts and tyrannical designs of every particular mans self-love are withheld”.
It is indeed true, Nicole thinks, that “fear of death is then the first tye of civil so-
ciety, and the first check of self-love”.³⁶
Consequently, after a government and laws have been enforced, the way that
self-love side of amour-propre operates and our bid for power changes. Since
“open violence” is “excluded” from men’s options, they “seek other ways” to
win the worldly contest. They “substitute craft for force”.When men can no lon-
ger keep on “tyrannizing over” others, they have no other option but “to content
the self-love of those whom they” need.³⁷ This is a clear expression of the Hobb-
ist idea how justice and self-interested commerce come into the world. The idea
is still to overpower everyone else and beat others in the competition of gather-
ing supplies needed for self-preservation. It is not, Nicole reminds his audience,
that ‘this tyrannical inclination which makes us have a desire to rule and govern
by force over others’ would be lost after a government and laws have been instal-
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 125. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 149.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 126. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 150.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 126. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 150.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 127. I have retained the use of self-love
in this particular quote, because Nicole is pointing to this side of amour-propre instead of talking
about the broader concept in general. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’amour-propre,” in Essais de
morale, III, 152.
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led. It is still “lively in the hearts of men”. In his darker moments Nicole even
hints that men are merely “forced to dissemble it, until they are strengthened
by gaining others by sweet ways, to have afterwards the means to bring them
to their bent by force”.³⁸ Thus, the only thing that actually has changed concern-
ing the self-love side of amour-propre is that means are different and now we
have laws and justice that restrict how men act. Obviously the greatest restraint
on men is the fear of “the punishment, which the laws threaten to those who
have recourse to violent ways”.³⁹ Consequently, since men are “forced” to
“obey the laws”, they at least momentarily “forget these vast thoughts of dom-
ination” because it is “so impossible” for “them to prosper therein”.⁴⁰
Self-interest and commerce replace the physical struggle concerning the self-
love side of amour-propre in a political society. Pierre Nicole is very specific in his
description of this interested commerce. He uses the terms “utilities”, “inter-
ests”, “gifts”, “mon[e]y”, “labours”, “toyls”, “services”, “real goods”, “merchan-
dises”, “traffick”, “trade”, and “commerce” when describing interested com-
merce. According to Nicole, even the exchange of civilities can be seen as part
of this interested commerce, if the idea is that for “vain complacencies we obtain
effective commodities”.⁴¹ It is indeed “by the means and help of this commerce,
all necessaries for this life are in some sort supplied for”.⁴² However, what I find
interesting is that for Nicole this self-love side of amour-propre is something that
has to be accounted for before getting to the actual point he is making in Of char-
ity and self-love -essay and what is truly interesting about amour-propre.
Self-Love and Pride
As we have seen, up to this point everything seems to be in agreement with a
common perception of a Hobbist account of the origin of civil society. But all
of a sudden, a rapid change takes place in Nicole’s argument in his essay Of
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 129. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 153.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 130. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 154.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 127. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 151.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 128. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 152.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 127. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 152– 153.
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charity and self-love. After saying all this about laws, justice, self-love and inter-
ested commerce, Nicole is quick to point out there are “many people”, whose “in-
clination of making themselves be beloved is stronger than that of domineering
and lording over men”. Thus, we haven’t yet said enough about amour-propre. It
is only now that Nicole starts to develop an original part of his analysis. The pre-
vious observation is the key to Nicole’s moral philosophy. Nicole’s argument is
that amour-propre has two different sides – the self-love side, which in the Hobb-
ist theory is more or less accounted for, and another side, which has been forgot-
ten. This theoretical distinction is once more geometrical in design. The self-love
side of amour-propre makes us want “to be rich and powerful”, but this inclina-
tion is often overshadowed by another side of amour-propre, which takes into
consideration the “judgements” of others and makes us avoid their “hatred
and aversion”.⁴³ Like self-love, this is a universal propensity and there is not a
human being that would “not desire to be loved” and take “great pleasure”
when others are “turned towards them” and look favourably upon them.⁴⁴
When examined from this perspective it turns out that Nicole’s attitude to-
wards Hobbism and the self-love side of amour-propre is in fact uninspired. Nic-
ole freely borrows the idea of the origin of government from Hobbes. He runs fast
through it in order to get to his actual point. As an observer of human condition,
Nicole is generally fascinated by the idea that we are often completely unaware
whether our motives are sincere or not. However, in the case of self-love side of
amour-propre we often “easily” distinguish “what we do, either through human
fear or through gross interest”.⁴⁵ In other words, there is no real intellectual chal-
lenge here for Nicole. The matter is completely “different regarding the subtlety
of the love and esteem for men”.⁴⁶
This distinction between two different sides of amour-propre leads Nicole
into a theoretical conclusion about civil society. Because of this division in
amour-propre, according to Nicole, there are three attributes that ultimately ren-
der the existence of civil society possible. Two of these seem to be directly bor-
rowed from Hobbes. First, amour-propre hinders us “through fear of chastise-
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 133. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 157.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 132. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 157.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 135: “absolute interest”. Nicole, “De la
charité et de l’amour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 160 ‘un interêt grossier’.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” inMoral essays, III, 135: “it is not”… “the same of love, and
esteem for men”, Nicole, “De la charité et de l’amour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 160 “il n’
en est pas de même de la recherche de l’ amour et de l’ estime des hommes”.
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ment” and death “to violate the laws” and removes us “by this means outwardly
from all the crimes”. Second, amour-propre “comforts the necessities of others”
in “the sight of” man’s own “proper interest” (thus, the idea of justice and inter-
ested commerce). These two principles, in Nicole’s understanding, are the quin-
tessence of Hobbes’s conception of self-love. But Nicole’s point is that in human
life “there are many occasions, where neither fear nor interest have any place”.⁴⁷
Therefore we additionally need to take into consideration a third feature of
amour-propre to form a coherent theory of it. “The most general” passion that
“springs from amour-propre” is “the desire of being loved” that Hobbes did
not take into consideration.⁴⁸ Nicole’s insight is that “there is hardly any action”
that we would take in order to “please God”, “whereunto amour-propre cannot
engage us to please men”.⁴⁹ Out of these three principles it is the third, the in-
clination that renders us to please others, that is the most effective in upholding
civil society. As a feature of amour-propre it is “much more extended than the
two others”.⁵⁰ This is the core of Nicole’s redefinition of amour-propre and his
criticism of Hobbism. If the idea is to form a theory of civil society based on
human nature and this third feature is missing from our definition of amour-
propre, it is unsurprising that civility and politeness are not an integral part of
the Hobbist understanding of civil science. Simultaneously, it becomes overtly
clear that theoretically politeness has little to do with interested commerce.
The reason why “we desire to be belov’d”, Nicole emphasises, is “that we
may love our selves more”. The sole object of this propensity is to support the
good opinion that we have of ourselves. “The love which others bear us
makes us judge we deserve to be belov’d, and makes us frame of our selves a
more lovely idea”.⁵¹ For Nicole, people’s approval is “the object of our vanity”
and “the nourishment of amour-propre”. But in fact, Nicole highlights, it is
even more than this. It is “the bed or couch whereon our weakness rests”, he un-
derlines in Of charity and self-love. The same idea is expressed also in Of Chris-
tian civility. Our opinion of ourselves is laid on such a vulnerable ground that “it
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 135. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 160.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 133. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 158.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 134. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 159.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 134–5. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 160.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, II, 233. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, II, 126.
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cannot sustain it self without being under-propt by the approbation and love of
others”.⁵²
Nicole’s more nuanced understanding of amour-propre becomes inevitable
when we broaden our reading of his essays beyond Of charity and self-love. All
human beings, except perhaps the ones who have efficient grace, are proud
and vain to some extent and eager to entertain a good opinion of themselves.
It is unquestionably a token of vanity if we love ourselves instead of God. On sev-
eral occasions Nicole calls attention to the fact that this self-liking side of amour-
propre is directly linked to what is commonly called pride. “Pride”, Nicole in one
of his essays defines, is “a swelling of the heart, by which man dilates and mag-
nifies himself in his own imaginations”. Men have an inherent inclination to
overvalue themselves, which “imprints” them with fantastic ideas of “strength”,
“greatness” and “excellence”.⁵³ The only reason why we additionally so passion-
ately “desire” the “approbation of others” is that when we acquire it “we are
settl’d and fortifi’d in the idea we have of our own excellence”. It simply per-
suades us that “we are not mistaken in the opinion we have of our selves”.⁵⁴
It is the “greatest pleasure of a proud man” to “contemplate the idea which he
makes of himself”, which “is the origin of all his vain satisfactions”. In human
mind practically everything is related to this idea of self and for a proud man
“nothing pleaseth him but in proportion as it contributes to puff it up, to
adorn it, and to render it more lively”.⁵⁵ In brief, when “the world looks on us
with esteem”, we “settle in us a better opinion of our selves”.⁵⁶ By and large,
“the true end and aim of the ambitious and voluptuous man, is but to underprop
and hold up his weakness by some externe support”.⁵⁷
Inevitably, since the approbation of others is “so necessary to keep up our
hearts”, “we are naturally inclin’d to seek and procure it”.⁵⁸ Human weakness
 Nicole, “Of Christian civility,” inMoral essays, II, 233–4. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’amour-
propre,” in Essais de morale, II, 127.
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” inMoral essays, I, 1. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de l’homme,”
in Essais de morale, I, 1.
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 2–3. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 4.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 5. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 6.
 Nicole, “Of Christian civility,” in Moral essays, II, 238. Nicole, “De la civilite Chrétienne,” in
Essais de morale, II, 131.
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 33. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 69.
 Nicole, “Of Christian civility,” in Moral essays, II, 234. Nicole, “De la civilite Chrétienne,” in
Essais de morale, II, 127.
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might perhaps not be anything to rejoice at, but when judged from the perspec-
tive that underlines social cohesion in a secular world, the attitude seems to be
much more ambivalent. There is indeed a positive, natural effect of the fact that
“we must be flattered and caressed like children to be kept in a good humour” or
“in our fashion we fall a crying, as children do in theirs”.⁵⁹ It is only from the
supposition of our weakness that Nicole may conclude that “there is hardly” any-
thing that makes a stronger “impression upon the mind” than “the fear of mens
judgements” that “springs only from vanity”.⁶⁰ It is the insecurity of the opinion
of ourselves (for Nicole a human being is always an insignificant being, thus this
insecurity is always apparent) that makes us desirous of other people’s approval,
which in turn renders us sociable.
Path to Politeness
Nicole reminds his audience in several essays that men have a natural desire to
boast their pride and expose it for the world to see. “There is”, he writes, “a
pleasure in hearing amour-propre speak when it is not disguised at all”.⁶¹ In
fact, “every one” has “a desire either to disparage others, or to distinguish him-
self from them”.⁶² The implication is, of course, that since everyone is affected
through these very same drives, amour-propre takes a different route.
Nicole calls attention to the fact that we are unable to fully understand the
workings of our own amour-propre because it cunningly deceives us, yet we are
extremely sharp “when we perceive it” somewhere else. In others it “appears” to
us “under its natural form, and we hate it by so much more as we love our
selves”. But why do we hate it? Simply because of the fact that amour-propre
of “other men opposes all” our own “desires”.⁶³ Consequently, this has a direct
impact on the development of civil society. Once men have been living in a soci-
ety for some time, everyone becomes perfectly sensible that he is not the only
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 26. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 55.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 173. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 206–207.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 10. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 12.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 2. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 2–3.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 125. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 148.
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one that has the urge to speak freely and to express the sentiments of the esteem
that he has for himself. Men learn that “nothing” draws as much “aversion” as
this inclination. Amour-propre simply “cannot shew it self without exciting it”.
Men “are not able to suffer” pride when they “discover it”. Thus, “it is easie”
for them to “judge” that the case will not be any different when others discover
their true sentiments.⁶⁴ It is this experience of the world that “inclines those who
are sensible of the hatred of men” to try “not to expose themselves thereunto”.
As a result, they withdraw their amour-propre “from the sight of others”, they
“start to disguise and counterfeit it” and from henceforth they never “shew it
under its natural shape”. The method is simply ‘to imitate the behaviour of
those who would be intirely exempt from it’.⁶⁵ These might be somewhat com-
mon notions in seventeenth-century France, but it is Nicole’s original contribu-
tion to moral philosophy that he shows us how the rules of good-breeding and
politeness are derived from the self-liking side of amour-propre – in a parallel
way as laws and justice are derived from the self-love side of amour-propre.
The core of politeness is simply that pride should not be visible. It is “this
suppression of amour-propre”, Nicole stresses, “which makes human civility”.⁶⁶
Politeness is “but a kind of traffick” of the self-liking side of amour-propre,
“wherein we endeavour to” lure “the affection of others by owing a kindness
for them”.⁶⁷ We may easily point out from this quote the connotations to com-
merce and trade, but we have to be careful not to make the mistake of assuming
that there would be some kind of material interest involved in the trafficking of
the self-liking side of amour-propre. In human civility there are no gross interests
involved. Indeed, Nicole wants to point out the analogy between interested com-
merce (that is the way self-love side of amour-propre functions in civil society)
and reciprocal nature of politeness. However, he is even more eager to keep
these two different institutions apart. There is a good reason why useful and
agreeable are separate concepts. Of course, material interest and cupidity can
motivate individuals to behave politely, but as we saw earlier, in Nicole’s theory
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 135. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 161.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 136. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 161– 162.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 136. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 162. ‘l’ honnêteté humaine’. The idea is also to be
found in Pascal’s Thoughts, to which Nicole also refers to. I would like to thank Béatrice
Guion for pointing this out.
 Nicole, “Of Christian civility,” in Moral essays, II, 234–235. Nicole, “De la civilite Chréti-
enne,” in Essais de morale, II, 127.
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this kind of behaviour falls under the realm of interested commerce and self-
love, not humane civility and self-liking. If you flatter a person in order to get
some money from him, your behaviour is part of the interested commerce
(that Nicole looks down with contempt). If you flatter the same person, so that
he would approve your character and you may entertain a better opinion
about yourself, this is humane civility (towards which Nicole’s attitude is
much more ambivalent). In practice, it might perhaps be impossible to keep
these two spheres from overlapping, but theoretically it is important for Nicole
that they are not confused as the same institution.
Nicole also demonstrates how politeness keeps evolving. He points out that
“these demonstrations of affection for the most part are false”. They “run into
excess” and “we make a shew of more love than we have”. In fact, “in the
room of real love, we substitute a language full of affection”.⁶⁸ Plainly put, the
“discourses of civility”, which are “so ordinary in the mouths of men” are far
apart “from the sentiments of their heart”.⁶⁹
But if the development brings about a custom of flattery and insincerity,
moreover, men will soon learn to “keep themselves generally to a distance
from all that seems vanity”. Hence, the tolerable appearance of “modesty”
comes into the world.⁷⁰ In fact, “civility” does not merely make men to dissim-
ulate and smooth the appearance of their “base vain glories” (which they actual-
ly are so eager to show). Since men in general are so “extremely subtile in dis-
covering the by-ways which may be taken to make manifest in us what we
desire to shew”, “civility renounces these small crafts, and studies to avoid
them”. Simultaneously, a new fashion comes about and, at least in theory,
soon there is nothing “more simple and humble” than the “discourses” of the
world. Because of the nature of amour-propre, it is rendered “a general rule”
that a man is “never to speak of himself”. If he is forced to make a comment
on himself, it has to be done “with more coldness and indifferency than of oth-
ers”.⁷¹ However, this does not mean that men who have adopted this new fashion
would actually be humble. As Nicole points out, “pride” is “born with man” and
 Nicole, “Of Christian civility,” in Moral essays, II, 235. Nicole, “De la civilite Chrétienne,” in
Essais de morale, II, 127.
 Nicole, “Of Christian civility,” in Moral essays, II, 235. Nicole, “De la civilite Chrétienne,” in
Essais de morale, II, 128.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 138. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 164.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 139. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 165.
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it “never abandons him”. Therefore, “in the conduct” that seems humble we may
often find “a more cunning and delicate sentiment of this pride”.⁷²
It goes without saying that Nicole’s normative position is different from his
naturalistic description of politeness. However, I have no interest in the attempt
to show Nicole’s conception of Christian civility. Additionally, the actual meth-
ods how to operate politeness (or laws that protect self-love) and the locus
where they are practised are of no concern. The relevant part is to examine
the theoretical foundation behind (in Humean terms) artificial moral institutions
and how they are derived from human nature. “It is manifest”, Nicole clearly
points out, that all ‘conduct’, which falls under the institution of politeness, is
in the end aiming “directly” at the self-liking side of “amour-propre”, since
the idea is to “obtain the esteem of the friendship of men”.⁷³ In my opinion,
what is crucial for Nicole is this link between the moral institution and the pas-
sion (self-liking side of amour-propre) and the idea that this is analogous to jus-
tice and the self-love side of amour-propre.
Search for Truth, Melancholy and Progress
Interesting fact is that even when Nicole stresses that the expressions of civility
are exaggerated and often false, yet the institution compels us “to praise volun-
tarily what is praise-worthy, to set a value as great as we can on other mens good
qualities, and not to refuse even to our enemies our testimonies of esteem which
they deserve”. If we fail to follow these obvious guidelines, we are very unlikely
to meet with approbation from others. We also have to remember that men are
not merely judged by single instances but by the overall impression of their char-
acter. Nicole goes so far as to claim that “an extreme indulgence for other mens
faults”, hiding and excusing them as much as possible, “never” condemning
anyone, explicating “all to the best”, being “easily satisfied” and rather being
“deceived” than giving “way to suspicions which are hurtful” to others are all
part of civility. For Nicole “all this tends directly” in the end “to amour-propre”.⁷⁴
Perhaps Nicole is right that this is the only way that amour-propre actually “hin-
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 141. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 167.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 150. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 179.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 157. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 187.
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ders us for passing for proud and presumptuous”.⁷⁵ At least, if we take Nicole’s
word for it, it seems that in order to even uphold our self-esteem it takes much
more than an empty shell to actually “prosper in the design of making our selves
beloved”, to “acquire friends”, “pacifie our enemies” and to “keep a good corre-
spondence with all the world”.⁷⁶
Nicole does not think that a man ever succeeds in his forlorn battle of loving
himself as he ought to love God. Our high “opinions” about ourselves “are
grounded only upon a voluntary error”. For Nicole, it really does not matter
what we have achieved in the world. The opinions about ourselves “are never
firm and sure”, but “always mixed with mistrust, and consequently with melan-
choly, trouble and molestation”. Instead of “pure joy” and “full and entire satis-
faction which amour-propre aimeth at, all it can do” is “to suspend for some time
the sentiments of sadness, which are nourished at the bottom of the heart”.⁷⁷
Nicolean man is pathetic, but it is difficult to imagine a civil society more pro-
gressive than the one inhabited by these men.
The idea of God’s justice and order imprinted in men is a basic Christian doc-
trine, uninteresting as such. However, Nicole is effectively using it also as part of
his naturalistic account of civil society. I think that because of this paradoxical
contrast between the love of God and the love of self, the dynamic nature of Nic-
ole’s explanation of human progress appears almost modern. It is the agonising
conflict within every individual, who leads a secular life that keeps the world in
motion. Men are always in a genuine search after what they can think true and
good. According to Nicole, every human being has to believe, at least in some
very confused and obscure manner, that what he does and what he is, ultimately
is worthwhile. Nicole is very precise that “we can love nothing which we do not
think good” and “true”.⁷⁸ We “cannot” even “enjoy” anything, if we think that it
is “false”.⁷⁹ Thus, even when stirred by base motives and false judgement, “peo-
ple” have to “justifie in themselves and flatter themselves, that their stubborn-
ness, and their inflexibility in their sentiments, proceed only from the love
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 158. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 189.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 156–7. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 187.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” inMoral essays, III, 26. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 29.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 31. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 35.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” inMoral essays, III, 30. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 35.
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they have for truth”.⁸⁰ They “are so fashion’d by nature, that they lay hold on
nothing but what is by the understanding presented to them under the appear-
ance of some good”.⁸¹
What, of course, happens is that this seemingly noble quality turns upside
down. “The love of truth” is hailed as the first principle by everybody, but it usu-
ally unveils as an ill-servant because “the chief and principal use we make” of it
“is to persuade us that what we love is true”. As it often unfolds, we do not
“love” things “because they are true”, but “we believe them true, because we
love them”. Thus,we manage “to add” the “idea of truth” into our “inclinations”,
which only fixes us “more firmly” in our meaningless ways.⁸² It might seem that
in this manner Nicole drains the meaning of our love of truth, but he does not do
so entirely. It becomes apparent that “men would not be men, did they not run
after some true, or false light”.⁸³
If men always have to justify to themselves that they are looking for some-
thing that is good and true, it is equally natural that they think that ultimately
they are in search of harmony. The “life of a true Christian”, Nicole writes,
would be “a life of peace”, but the life of a man driven by his concupiscence
is a constant motion searching for peace that he cannot find. God’s will is “im-
moveable” and “the bent and inclination of a virtuous man is towards silence as
much as possible he can”.⁸⁴ The inclination of the common sinner is “to fly from
himself” believing that ‘his happiness consists in being forgetful of himself, and
running headlong into this forgetfulness’.⁸⁵
As mistaken as they might be, men are genuinely and naturally aiming for
the satisfaction that is not to be found Nicole underlines in his essay Of the
knowledge of one’s self. The scenario is further complicated by the fact that
even when men are constantly turning their eyes away from themselves, they
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 108. Nicole, “De la connois-
sance de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 128.
 Nicole, “A discourse of the necessity of not trusting the conduct of ones life to chance, and of
not guiding it by the rules of fancy,” inMoral essays, II, 122. Nicole, “Discours sur la necessité de
se nepas conduire du hazard, et par des regles de fantaisie,” in Essais de morale, II, 7.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” inMoral essays, III, 30. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 35.
 Nicole, “A discourse of the necessity of not trusting the conduct of ones life to chance, and of
not guiding it by the rules of fancy,” inMoral essays, II, 122. Nicole, “Discours sur la necessité de
se nepas conduire du hazard, et par des regles de fantaisie,” in Essais de morale, II, 7.
 Nicole, “Of submissions to the will of God,” in Moral essays, I, 76. Nicole, “De la soumission
à la volonté de Dieu,” in Essais de morale, I, 158.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 4. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 4.
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have a natural desire to think that they are doing the very opposite. A Nicolean
man is truly a paradox. We have “two inclinations”. “One”, which “makes us to
fly” from ourselves, and “the other”, which makes us “to seek the knowledge of
our selves”. They are both “natural” and “spring” from “the same fountain”.⁸⁶
Knowing and not knowing ourselves is difficult. A “vain” man, sooner or later,
“will” always “see” his meaningless and worthless self.⁸⁷ “Truth always makes
it self a little light through all those clouds wherewith men strive to obscure
it”. Once amour-propre is at the brink of acquiring satisfaction, there are “always
some rays” that come and “incommode pride”and “trouble” the “false quiet
which it endeavours to procure it self”.⁸⁸ Naturally, a man “avoids seeing” his
actual state, “because being vain he is not able to suffer the sight of his faults
and miseries”. “To accord these two contrary desires” a man has to be extremely
astute to find “means” that are “worthy his vanity” and “satisfy” both of these
inclinations “at the same time”. It truly takes “craft or subtility” from the Nico-
lean man to be able to “cover all his faults” and “only to include’ to “the image
which he” forms “of himself” those “qualities which may raise him in his own
thoughts”.⁸⁹ It is interesting that Pierre Nicole puts so much effort to show that a
man has to genuinely succeed in deceiving himself (not merely other people) and
believe that he is as worthy as he would like to think. Of the knowledge of one’s
self is a timely intervention on the human condition.
Meanwhile, what happens is that these Nicolean men are constantly forced
to “renew the idea of their me”. It is “this idea” of self that causes “their pleasure
during their fortune” and “their displeasure during their disgrace”.⁹⁰ Once the
former ground where men had placed the idea of their own excellence (or virtue)
crumbles down – as it always does – they have to find some new ground where
they can build it anew or at least support the old foundation. They are in con-
stant motion and renewing the idea of self. There is “no other end” than
“amour-propre” for their “actions”, but ultimately what is directing these actions
is the need to “joyn always to the idea that they have of themselves, new orna-
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 5. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 6.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 6. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 7.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 25. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 29.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 6. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 7.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 9. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 10.
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ments and new titles”.⁹¹ Nicole’s explanation of the cause of human progress is
admirable. The idea is that ‘our vanity remains’ only “half satisfied” – at best.⁹²
Thus, our whole personal identity becomes dependent upon movement.We are,
at least in some sense, continuously refining and progressing, but only because
there is no end to it. There is no goal and no true satisfaction that we can achieve
in this world. If the motion ceases we simply cannot bear ourselves. The only way
that our love for ourselves is supported is by “leaning to a number of petty sup-
ports” and we need an innumerable amount of these “little props and helps” to
“keep it in repose”.⁹³ But once we come to realise (as we sooner or later always
do) that the old supports were not enough to fully satisfy our vanity, we have to
start looking for some new ones and the circle continues. “It is” only “by contin-
ual changes the soul maintains it self in a condition it can away with, and that it
hinders it self from being overwhelmed with grief and melancholy”. Nicole’s dra-
matic summary is that “the soul subsists only by art”.⁹⁴ Thus, we manage to cre-
ate a vicious circle that is not completely tinted off track, because we have to
genuinely believe that what we are looking for is true and good and we are
also fully dependent on the opinion and approval of others. Life is but a post-
ponement of melancholy and sadness. Yet, men keep on searching and refining
their petty little ways. Meanwhile, bridges are built, fashions change and hats
come off. In short, at least all the necessities of life are supplied for and conver-
sations are more or less agreeable.
Without the idea that the truth and God are implanted in us, Nicole’s scheme
would go astray. Even when we are constantly fooling ourselves and desperately
renewing the image we have of ourselves, we need to be able to believe that the
things we love are actually good and real – that we are true and good. A man
would not be a man if he did not think that he is searching for the truth. But
if you are not looking from the right place, Nicole in his normative doctrine lec-
tures, you will never find it. Your vanity will always remain, at best, half-satis-
fied. However, the choice that Nicole has to offer does not look too appealing
for the common sinner. In fact, a fallen man is not too willing to look for
inner peace, because the price to pay is too high. It would take too much to ac-
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 8. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 9.
 Nicole, “Of the knowledge of one’s self,” in Moral essays, III, 17. Nicole, “De la connoissance
de soi-même,” in Essais de morale, III, 19.
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 28. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 59.
 Nicole, “Of the weakness of man,” in Moral essays, I, 29. Nicole, “De la faiblesse de
l’homme,” in Essais de morale, I, 61.
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cept his worthlessness. Even the idea of facing the fact that he is not as great or
virtuous as he would like to be shuns him. Thus, more often than not, people
keep trying to satisfy their self-liking, time and again, using their able imagina-
tion to think of different ways how to achieve the impossible.
Conclusion
Pierre Nicole has received attention from modern scholars because he is one of
the first early-modern authors to outline the idea how a secular society can be
rendered peaceful based on enlightened self-interest.⁹⁵ “One may say truly”, Nic-
ole writes, “that absolutely to reform the world, that’s to say to banish all the
vices”, all you need to do is “to give every one an enlightened amour-propre”
[amour-propre éclairé]. Such a “society” might be “corrupt” inside, but “there
would be nothing better ordered, more civil, more just, more peaceable, more
honest, more generous” and, significantly, more “admirable” than this. The rea-
son why this society would be admirable, according to Nicole, is that even when
nothing but amour-propre would move it, amour-propre “would not appear
there” at all.⁹⁶
This idea of “amour-propre éclairé” has usually been understood in the nar-
row Hobbist sense as “enlightened self-interest”.⁹⁷ If anything, we have to take
into consideration both sides of Nicole’s conception of amour-propre and put
a strong emphasis on the self-liking, instead of self-love, since this is Nicole’s
theoretical invention. Even when “true interests” are certainly involved in this so-
ciety, curiously the self-liking side,which is the crux of Nicole’s line of reasoning,
has partly escaped modern scholars. To summarise my argument, it is both jus-
tice and politeness that have to be accounted for if we want to talk about Nicole’s
 On this point see particularly Dale Van Kley, “Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of
Enlightened Self-Interest”, in Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France and Germa-
ny, ed. A. C. Kors and Paul Korshin (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987),
69–85.
 Nicole, “Of charity and self-love,” in Moral essays, III, 165. Nicole, “De la charité et de l’a-
mour-propre,” in Essais de morale, III, 197.
 See however,Van Kley, “Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of Enlightened Self-Inter-
est,” 69–85, which implicitly points out that Nicole is adding something to Hobbes’s account,
but which however does not bring out the clear and apparent theoretical framework that is Nic-
ole’s actual contribution to Enlightenment thought. The overall question is not whether enlight-
ened self-interest is pointed out as morally good, as Van Kley seems to think. The question is
what do we mean by amour-propre éclairé in the first place and how do we derive moral insti-
tutions from amour-propre.
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idea of enlightened amour-propre.⁹⁸ And for Nicole, it is the idea of the self-liking
side of amour-propre that plays the foundational role in rendering a secular so-
ciety tolerable.
The idea that two moral institutions, justice and politeness, (both derived
from amour-propre) are needed to render a society enlightened follows consis-
tently throughout Nicole’s essays. As he clearly points out, “we owe some things
to our neighbour by certain laws of justice; which are properly call’d laws”. Anal-
ogously, we owe him some other things “by the bare laws of civility”. Even when
these laws of civility are not laws in the strict sense of the word, “the obligation”
to follow them “springs from a consent amongst men” who have agreed “to
blame such as shall be defective in them”. Ultimately, it is “men” who “have es-
tablished all these laws”.⁹⁹ Based on “justice” and the “motion of interest” men
can “expect” certain “duties from us”. It is exactly “the same” that “happens in
the duties of civility”. Just like in our debts, if we “are wanting” in civility, “oth-
ers are effectively offended”.¹⁰⁰
By and large, it is the rules of “civility” (not honesty, as the anonymous English
translator repeatedly suggests) and “justice” that are needed in civil society.¹⁰¹ As
 In other words, Nicole anticipates what I have argued about Mandeville and Hume in Tolo-
nen, Mandeville and Hume: Anatomists of Civil Society (Oxford: SVEC, 2013).
 Nicole, “Of the means to conserve peace amongst men,” in Moral essays, I, 141. Nicole, “Des
moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes,” in Essais de morale, I, 282.
 Nicole, “Of the means to conserve peace amongst men,” inMoral essays, I, 143. Nicole, “Des
moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes,” in Essais de morale, I, 285–286.
 Nicole, “Of the remedy against suspicion,” inMoral essays, III, 315. Nicole, “De la guérison des
soupçons,” in Essais de morale, III, 315: ‘lès regles de l’ honnêté et de la justice’. Nicole is consis-
tently using this parallel between civility and justice in his essays when he is discussing the prin-
ciple moral institutions.Yet, the English translation repeatedly mistakes honesty for civility. Cf. Nic-
ole, “Of reports,” inMoral essays, III, 268 ‘those who are wanting in what may lawfully be expected
from them, do undoubtedly wrong honesty [sic!] and justice, and ’tis enough to judge them guilty of
infidelity’ Nicole, “Des rapports,” in Essais de morale, III, 322 ‘ceux qui manquent à ce qu’ on peut
attendre legitimement d’ eux, blessent sans doute l’ honnêteté et la justice, et il suffit pour les juger
coupables d’ infidelité’. And Nicole, “Of the remedy against suspicion,” in Moral essays, III, p. 317
‘they may observe in this point, in respect of others, what honesty [sic!], charity, and justice de-
mands of us.’ Nicole, “De la guérison des soupçons,” in Essais de morale, III, 317 ‘garder sur ce
point à l’ égard des autres ce que l’ honnêteté, la charité et la justice demandent de nous.’ Keohane
has pointed out that when talking about ‘the idea of l’Honnête’ in ‘the last half of the senteenth
century in France’ the word ‘honesty is surely the wrong English word to use here’ and instead
‘the best terms’ for ‘capturing the meaning of l’honnêté’ are ‘civility, politeness’ and ‘propriety’. Keo-
hane, Philosophy and state in France, 283–284. It is interesting that the translator of Nicole’s essays
was making this precise mistake and thus this mistake in English was deeply rooted already in the
seventeenth century. According to Rogers, “In Praise of Vanity,” 1994, the best study of the many on
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Nicole describes, “men are link’d together by an infinite number of wants”. Thus,
they are obliged “out of necessity to live in society” since “each particular” is not
“able to subsist without others”. Now, it is obvious that this implies different kinds
of interests and commerce. However,what Nicole particularly wants to stress is that
“for keeping up society amongst men”, it is of “absolute necessity” that “they
should respect and love one another”. As always, Nicole wants to specifically
point out that in this moral institution there are no interests or money involved.
“There are a number”, he writes, “of small matters” which are “highly necessary
for life”. People should realise that they “are bestowed gratis” and never “to be
sold” because they “can only be had for love”. It is precisely the fact that the “so-
ciety” is “compos’d of men full of love and esteem for themselves” that special
“care” has to be taken “reciprocally to please and humour one another”. If not,
“it would prove a loose company”, “ill pleas’d and dissatisfied amongst them-
selves” and, in the end, not able to “continue united”. Logically, “since this mutual
love and esteem appears not outwardly, they have thought convenient to establish
amongst themselves certain devoirs, which should be so many tokens of respect
and affection”. Thus, it is the institution of politeness that is of importance in
the concept of “enlightened amour-propre”.¹⁰²
Only when we take into account that Nicole’s broad definition of amour-
propre has two different sides may we understand how he thinks that a secular
civil society is able to function. My argument is that this forms the blueprint for
Bernard Mandeville, David Hume and Adam Smith who follow Nicole’s path in
this overall distinction.¹⁰³ They all take their cue for their political philosophy
from the idea that we may derive justice and politeness from human nature,
namely from the two different sides of amour-propre. Of course, Mandeville,
Hume and Smith seriously modify the description of civil society by paying
close attention to natural and artificial moral qualities and the evolutionary na-
ture of moral institutions in the conjectural history of civil society. However, it
was Pierre Nicole who first outlined the overall blueprint for this project that
still plays a mediated role in some of our conceptions of the relationship be-
tween human nature and civil society.
honnêté is Jean-Pierre Dens, Honnête homme et la critique du goût: Esthétique et société au XVIIe
siècle (Lexington: French Forum, 1981).
 Nicole, “Of the means to conserve peace amongst men,” inMoral essays, I, 144– 145. Nicole,
“Des moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes,” in Essais de morale, I, 288.
 I’ve advanced this reading of Adam Smith in the Mandevillean context, for example, in
Mikko Tolonen, “Pride and moral fitness in the sceptical sentimentalism of Mandeville, Hume
and Smith” (paper presented at Inclusion and Exclusion in the History of Ideas Conference of
the Helsinki Centre for Intellectual History, Helsinki, December 14– 15, 2017).
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